Difference between revisions of "Comparison of AI takeoff scenarios"
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| − | ! Scenario !! Significant changes to the world prior to critical AI capability threshold being reached? !! Intelligence explosion? !! Decisive strategic advantage? / Unipolar outcome? | + | ! Scenario !! Significant changes to the world prior to critical AI capability threshold being reached? !! Intelligence explosion? !! Decisive strategic advantage? / Unipolar outcome? (i.e. not distributed) |
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| [[Yudkowskian]] hard takeoff || No || Yes || Yes | | [[Yudkowskian]] hard takeoff || No || Yes || Yes | ||
Revision as of 03:05, 24 February 2020
| Scenario | Significant changes to the world prior to critical AI capability threshold being reached? | Intelligence explosion? | Decisive strategic advantage? / Unipolar outcome? (i.e. not distributed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yudkowskian hard takeoff | No | Yes | Yes |
| Paul's slow takeoff | Yes | Yes | No |
| Daniel Kokotajlo | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Hansonian slow takeoff | Yes | No?[notes 1] | No |
| Eric Drexler's CAIS | Yes | No? I think he says something weird, like all of the AI systems together recursively self-improving at the all-AI-services-combined level, without a single agent-like AI that self-improves. | No? |
See also
Notes
- ↑ In some places Hanson says things like "You may recall that I did not dispute that an AI based economy would grow faster than does our economy today. The issue is the relative rate of growth of one AI system, across a broad range of tasks, relative to the entire rest of the world at that time." [1] This sounds more like Paul's takeoff scenario. I'm not clear on how the Paul and Hanson scenarios differ.
