Difference between revisions of "Christiano's operationalization of slow takeoff"
(→External links) |
(→External links) |
||
| Line 5: | Line 5: | ||
* https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/AfGmsjGPXN97kNp57/arguments-about-fast-takeoff/comment/ZyJwKwDrX5jWujXxo -- a technical point about the mathematics of this operationalization | * https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/AfGmsjGPXN97kNp57/arguments-about-fast-takeoff/comment/ZyJwKwDrX5jWujXxo -- a technical point about the mathematics of this operationalization | ||
* https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/aFaKhG86tTrKvtAnT/against-gdp-as-a-metric-for-timelines-and-takeoff-speeds | * https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/aFaKhG86tTrKvtAnT/against-gdp-as-a-metric-for-timelines-and-takeoff-speeds | ||
| + | * I think [[Daniel Kokotajlo]] had another post that gave counterexamples to the operationalization looking at historical GDP progress | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 23:15, 25 February 2021
In a 2018 blog post, Paul Christiano provided the following operationalization of slow takeoff: "There will be a complete 4 year interval in which world output doubles, before the first 1 year interval in which world output doubles. (Similarly, we’ll see an 8 year doubling before a 2 year doubling, etc.)"[1] Subsequently, this operationalization has been cited by many others in discussions of AI takeoff.
External links
- https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/AfGmsjGPXN97kNp57/arguments-about-fast-takeoff/comment/ZyJwKwDrX5jWujXxo -- a technical point about the mathematics of this operationalization
- https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/aFaKhG86tTrKvtAnT/against-gdp-as-a-metric-for-timelines-and-takeoff-speeds
- I think Daniel Kokotajlo had another post that gave counterexamples to the operationalization looking at historical GDP progress
