Difference between revisions of "Pascal's mugging and AI safety"
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* Argue that for probabilities like 1%, standard [[expected value]] calculations work fine. | * Argue that for probabilities like 1%, standard [[expected value]] calculations work fine. | ||
* Argue that reducing x-risk from AI safety is more like a 1% chance than like an astronomically small chance. | * Argue that reducing x-risk from AI safety is more like a 1% chance than like an astronomically small chance. | ||
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| + | Notably, [[Eliezer Yudkowsky]] has consistently argued against paying up in Pascal's mugging. | ||
[[Category:AI safety]] | [[Category:AI safety]] | ||
Revision as of 23:19, 12 November 2020
Existential risk reduction via work on AI safety has occasionally been compared to Pascal's mugging. The critic of AI safety argues that working on AI safety has a very small probability of a very big payoff, which sounds suspicious.
The standard resolution seems to be:
- Point out that there are different levels of what "very small probability" means. Some people think 1% is very small, whereas in Pascal's mugging we are dealing with astronomically small probabilities such as 1/3^^^3.
- Argue that for probabilities like 1%, standard expected value calculations work fine.
- Argue that reducing x-risk from AI safety is more like a 1% chance than like an astronomically small chance.
Notably, Eliezer Yudkowsky has consistently argued against paying up in Pascal's mugging.
